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Abstract 
In research on theory of mind (ToM) in individuals with an autism spectrum 
disorder (ASD) mainly static mind-reading tasks were used. In this study both a static 
(Eyes Test) and a more naturalistic (Empathic Accuracy Task) ToM measure were 
used to investigate the perspective taking abilities of adolescents with ASD (n = 13), 
adolescents with attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder (ADHD; n = 13) and 
typically developing adolescents (n = 18). An innovative aspect concerns the standard 
stimulus tapes of the Empathic Accuracy Task, which showed interactions between 
dyads of one adolescent with ADHD and one adolescent without ADHD. In this way, 
we were able to compare the ‘readability’ of the thoughts and feelings of adolescents 
with and without ADHD. The results clearly demonstrate the impairment in 
perspective taking abilities of adolescents with ASD, both on the static and 
naturalistic mind-reading task. Moreover, the Empathic Accuracy Task seems to be a 
useful and promising method to assess ToM abilities in adolescents, with or without 
clinical problems. Finally, thoughts and feelings of target persons with ADHD 
seemed to be less easy to read than the thoughts and feelings of typically developing 
target persons.  
  




In the last decade there has been great interest in measuring perspective taking 
and social cognition, especially in persons with autism spectrum disorders (ASD). 
One aspect of social cognition that has been studied intensively is theory of mind 
(ToM). ToM can be described as the ability to attribute mental states, such as 
intentions, beliefs and desires, to oneself and others and then using them to explain 
and predict behaviour (Baron-Cohen, Leslie, & Frith, 1985). The terms ‘mind-
reading’ and ‘perspective taking’ are often used as synonyms of the term Theory of 
Mind (Baron-Cohen, 1995; Baron-Cohen & Wheelwright, 2004). Many studies within 
this domain focused on the perspective taking abilities of children with ASD, who 
clearly experience difficulties in their ToM competence (Baron-Cohen, 1995; Baron-
Cohen et al., 1985; Leekam & Perner, 1991). These ToM impairments may underlie 
the social and communicative abnormalities that are characteristic of the disorder 
(Baron-Cohen, Jolliffe, Mortimore, & Robertson, 1997). However, some individuals 
with high-functioning autism (HFA) or Asperger Syndrome (AS) may pass the simple 
false-belief tasks, used to investigate ToM in children with ASD, in their teens 
(Bowler, 1992; Ozonoff, Pennington, & Rogers, 1991).  
This observation has given rise to a few “advanced” ToM tasks, which make it 
possible to cope with potential ceiling effects in the simple ToM tasks (Happé, 1994). 
One of the first advanced ToM measures was the “Reading the Mind in the Eyes” 
Test (Eyes Test), used in high-functioning adults with autism or AS (Baron-Cohen, 
Jolliffe et al., 1997). In the Eyes Task participants have to look at photographs of the 
eye region of faces and make a forced choice between which of two words best 
describes what the person in the picture might be thinking or feeling (Baron-Cohen, 
Jolliffe et al., 1997). This adult Eyes Test was revised in 2001 (Baron-Cohen, 
Wheelwright, Hill, Raste, & Plumb, 2001) and in the same year an adaptation of the 
test for children was used in a study with children with AS (Baron-Cohen, 
Wheelwright, Spong, Scahill, & Lawson, 2001). Research in adults with ASD, using 
the Eyes Test, yielded mixed results. In some studies, adults with ASD showed subtle 
theory of mind deficits on this task (Baron-Cohen, Jolliffe et al., 1997; Baron-Cohen, 
Wheelwright, & Jolliffe, 1997), while in other studies, where another set of facial 
pictures was used, adults with ASD performed as well as controls on the Eyes Test 
(Ponnet, Roeyers, Buysse, De Clercq, & Van Der Heyden, 2004; Roeyers, Buysse, 
Ponnet, & Pichal, 2001).  
However, the ecological validity of these static tests of perspective taking is 
limited (Ponnet et al., 2004). Social interaction in the real world is much more 
complex and the Eyes Test can hardly be seen as a naturalistic measure of social 
understanding (Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, Hill et al., 2001). A more naturalistic way 
of measuring empathic ability is provided by the empathic accuracy design of Ickes 
and colleagues (Ickes, 1993; Ickes, Stinson, Bissonnette, & Garcia, 1990). Good 
evidence for both the reliability and the validity of this method has been provided 
(Marangoni, Garcia, Ickes, & Teng, 1995). Empathic accuracy is defined as the 
degree to which an individual is able to accurately infer the specific content of 
another person’s thoughts and feelings (Ickes et al., 1990; Zaki, Bolger, & Ochsner, 
2008). In the current study, the standard stimulus design was used to investigate the 
empathic accuracy abilities in different groups of adolescents. In the standard 
stimulus paradigm, individual participants each view the same standard set of 
videotaped interactions and try to infer the thoughts and feelings of the same set of 
target persons (Marangoni et al., 1995). Roeyers et al. (2001) and Ponnet et al. (2004) 
found that adults with pervasive developmental disorders (PDD) and adults with AS 
were able to infer the thoughts and feelings of target persons while watching a 
structured interaction (game situation – target persons immediately started to play a 
board game), but performed worse than the control group when they watched an 
unstructured situation (getting acquainted situation – target persons had a 
conversation of the ‘getting acquainted’ type). Ponnet, Buysse, Roeyers, and De 
Clercq (2008) found that the structure of the situation matters for the mind-reading 
abilities of subjects with ASD. The mind-reading differences between young adults 
with ASD and typically developing controls were more pronounced when subjects 
had to infer the thoughts and feelings of other persons in a less structured 
conversation. Gleason, Jensen-Campbell, and Ickes (2009) extended the standard 
stimulus paradigm by studying adolescents. Their results revealed that adolescents 
who obtained higher empathic accuracy scores were more likely to have better quality 
friendships, and experienced lower levels of relational victimization. Additionally, 
adolescents who were at highest risk for internalizing and social problems were 
adolescents who had low scores on the empathic accuracy task, and on peer 
dimensions such as number of friends and friendship quality. Gleason et al. (2009) 
suggested that empathic accuracy in childhood relationships might be a buffering 
mechanism that protects children against the development of impaired peer 
relationships and adjustment problems.  
In the current study, a few shortcomings in research on perspective taking and 
empathic accuracy are considered and dealt with. First of all, as Baron-Cohen 
suggested (Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, Hill et al., 2001; Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, 
Spong et al., 2001), developmentally appropriate tests are needed in order to reveal 
the manifestations of the ToM abnormalities in people with autism. As mentioned 
earlier, ToM instruments underwent an evolution that started with the use of false-
belief tasks in children with autism. As a second step these simple tasks were adapted 
with the ‘advanced’ mindreading tasks as result. Today, a more naturalistic design for 
measuring empathic abilities can be found in the empathic accuracy task that has been 
used primarily in adults with ASD (Ponnet et al., 2004; Roeyers et al., 2001). The 
empathic accuracy task has proven to be a useful method to measure the capacity for 
perspective taking in adolescents (Gleason et al., 2009; Haughen, Welsh, & McNulty, 
2008). To our knowledge, the current study is the first to administer the empathic 
accuracy task in adolescents with ASD. Since adults with ASD are performing quite 
well on static mind-reading tasks and manage to infer the thoughts and feelings of 
target persons in a structured interaction during an empathic accuracy task (Ponnet et 
al., 2004; Roeyers et al., 2001), while children with ASD fail most of the mind-
reading tasks (Baron-Cohen, 1995; Baron-Cohen et al., 1985; Leekam & Perner, 
1991), a delay in the development of perspective taking abilities can be considered as 
one possible explanation of the mind-reading disabilities in children with ASD. 
Hence, we expect that adolescents with ASD will perform more poorly than typically 
developing adolescents on the Eyes Test and the empathic accuracy task. These 
expectations are in line with the research findings of previous studies with static ToM 
measures in adolescents with ASD (Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, Spong et al., 2001; 
Dyck et al., 2001; Kaland, Callesen, Moller-Nielsen, Mortensen, & Smith, 2008).  
Furthermore, most research on perspective taking compared the ToM abilities 
in persons with ASD and a non-clinical control group. As one of the exceptions, 
Buitelaar, Van der Wees, Swaab-Barneveld, and Van der Gaag (1999) examined 
differences in ToM performance between autistic, pervasive developmental disorder-
not otherwise specified (PDD-NOS), psychiatric control and typically developing 
children. This study revealed that autistic and PDD-NOS children could not be 
differentiated from the psychiatric controls with a diagnosis of attention-
deficit/hyperactivity disorder (ADHD). These results support the notion that ToM 
deficits are not specific to autism and ASD (Dyck et al., 2001). Gillberg (1992) 
suggested ten years earlier that both ASD and ADHD are part of a class of ‘Empathy 
Disorders’. Moreover, Braaten and Rosén (2000) found that boys with ADHD were 
less empathic than boys without ADHD, as measured by an empathy response task. 
Although children with ADHD do not always seem to show ToM deficits (Dyck et 
al., 2001; Perner, Kain, & Barchfeld, 2002), their impaired empathic abilities were 
confirmed in different studies (Dyck et al., 2001; Marton, Wiener, Rogers, Moore, & 
Tannock, 2009). In the present study, the mind-reading abilities of adolescents with 
ASD were compared with both a clinical control group of adolescents with ADHD 
and a non-clinical control group of typically developing adolescents. We expect that 
both adolescents with ASD and adolescents with ADHD will show aberrant mind-
reading abilities. These problems can be related to the social problems that persons 
with ASD and persons with ADHD experience (Luteijn et al., 2000). 
A static Eyes Test and a more naturalistic Empathic Accuracy Test were used 
to investigate the mind-reading performance of the adolescents. To gain an insight 
into their perceived mind-reading abilities, both the adolescents and their parents were 
asked to complete a questionnaire, measuring the tendency to take another person’s 
point of view. We expect that both adolescents with ASD, adolescents with ADHD 
and their parents will report that mind-reading abilities are to some extent impaired in 
ASD and ADHD.  
An innovative aspect in this study concerns the standard stimulus tapes. These 
tapes showed interactions between dyads of one adolescent with ADHD and one 
adolescent without ADHD. In this way, we were able to compare the ‘readability’ of 
the thoughts and feelings of adolescents with and without ADHD. After all, although 
it is known that recognition of emotions and mental states is based on the integration 
of multimodal information, such as semantic information, prosody and nonverbal 
visual cues (body postures and facial expressions) (Golan, Baron-Cohen, & Golan, 
2008; Herba & Phillips, 2004), it is unknown how these factors contribute to the 
readability of specific thoughts and emotions. A certain amount of variability in 
behaviour within the chosen target dyads was expected, such as the degree of 
restlessness, expressivity, hyperactivity and the congruency of the thought/feeling 
with the overt behaviour. The effect of these factors on the readability of thoughts and 
feelings of target persons with and without ADHD was investigated in this study (see 
supplementary material).  
 
2. Material and methods 
2.1 Participants 
Three groups of adolescents took part in this study: 19 adolescents with ASD, 
16 adolescents with ADHD and a control group of 18 typically developing (TD) 
adolescents. Participants from the clinical groups were recruited from the child 
psychiatry department of the Ghent University hospital and from a special school. All 
participants with ASD or ADHD had been diagnosed by a multidisciplinary team of 
experienced clinicians and fulfilled DSM-IV-TR criteria of the disorders. The 
diagnosis of the children with ASD was confirmed by the Autism Diagnostic 
Interview, Revised (ADI-R; Lord, Rutter, & Lecouteur, 1994), the Autism Diagnostic 
Observational Schedule, Generic (ADOS-G; Lord et al., 2004), the Childhood Autism 
Rating Scale (CARS; Schopler, Reichler, Devellis, & Daly, 1980) or a combination of 
these measures. Three adolescents who fulfilled criteria for both disorders were 
removed from the sample. Furthermore, 3 adolescents with ASD and 2 adolescents 
with ADHD were removed from the sample, because their IQ scores did not fall 
within the normal range. 
Participants were in the age range of 11-17 years. Only the IQ scores of the 
clinical groups were known, but since the TD group consisted of a random group of 
typically developing children, who were average performing students in mainstream 
education, the mean IQ of the control group can be considered to be in the normal 
range. A series of univariate analyses of variance (ANOVAs) revealed no significant 
between group differences for full scale IQ, verbal IQ or performance IQ of the ASD 
group and ADHD group. Age and IQ information are presented in Table 1. 
 
Insert Table 1 here 
 
2.2 Materials 
2.2.1 Interpersonal Reactivity Index (IRI): The IRI (Davis, 1983) is a self-
report questionnaire with 28 items, subdivided in four 7-item subscales. The 
participant scores each item on a 5-point Likertscale, ranging from ‘does not describe 
me well’ to ‘describes me very well’. Each subscale measures a specific aspect of 
‘empathy’, based on a multidimensional approach of empathy (cognitive and 
emotional) (Davis, 1983). 
The perspective-taking (PT) subscale measures the tendency to adopt other 
people’s position in everyday life. The empathic concern (EC) subscale measures the 
tendency to experience feelings of warmth, compassion and concern for other people. 
The personal distress (PD) subscale investigates feelings of unease and discomfort in 
reaction to the emotions of others. The last IRI subscale, the fantasy (F) subscale, 
measures the tendency to imagine oneself in the feelings and actions of fictive figures 
in books, movies and plays (Davis, 1983). Evidence for the reliability and validity of 
the IRI subscales comes from different sources (Davis, 1983; Yarnold, Bryant, 
Nightingale, & Martin, 1996). The internal consistency (Cronbach’s alpha) in this 
study is .85 for the ASD group, .80 for the ADHD group and .78 for the TD group. In 
this study, we used a Dutch translation of the IRI (Ponnet, Buysse, Roeyers, & De 
Corte, 2005). Both adolescent participants and their parents completed the 
questionnaire.  
 
2.2.2 “Reading the Mind in the Eyes” Test (Eyes Test): The Eyes Test is a 
static measure of empathic accuracy. We used the child version of the “Reading the 
Mind in the Eyes” Test (Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, Spong et al., 2001). With 
permission of the authors, this test was translated into Dutch and the backtranslation 
was authorized by the authors as well.  
The Eyes Test consists of 28 photographs of the eye region of human faces. 
The participants are asked to make a forced choice between four mental state terms 
and to choose the word that best describes what the person in the photo is thinking or 
feeling (Dorris, Espie, Knott, & Salt, 2004). Only one of the four mental state terms is 
considered correct. The mental state terms comprise both affective and non-affective 
(cognitive) mental state terms (Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, Spong et al., 2001). The 
Eyes Test includes a control task for non-mentalistic social intelligence: the 
adolescents are asked to identify the gender of the person in each photograph (Gender 
Task).  
 
2.2.3 Empathic Accuracy Task: The Empathic Accuracy Task, a naturalistic 
task of empathic accuracy, is based on the standard stimulus paradigm of Ickes. In 
this paradigm, individual participants look at the same standard set of videotaped 
interactions and try to infer the thoughts and feelings of the same set of target persons 
(Marangoni et al., 1995; Roeyers et al., 2001). Ickes and his colleagues provided good 
evidence for the reliability and the validity of this method (Ickes, 1993; Ickes et al., 
1990; Marangoni et al., 1995; Roeyers et al., 2001).  
The standard stimulus tape in this study consisted of ten fragments with 
interactions between five dyads of adolescents who were initially strangers to each 
other (for more information about the making of the standard stimulus tape – see 
supplementary material). The dyads consisted of one adolescent with ADHD and one 
adolescent without ADHD. These adolescents were filmed without their knowledge 
during two interaction situations: an acquaintance situation and a game situation. 
After the two interaction situations and a partial debriefing, the targets were asked to 
view their videotape and to make a written record of all their unexpressed thoughts 
and feelings (Ponnet et al., 2004; Roeyers et al., 2001). To be sure that the two 
videotapes showed similarly structured situations, the degree of structure of the target 
interactions was evaluated by 5 naive observers. No significant difference was found 
in the extent to which both videotapes showed more or less structured situations. 
The resulting standard stimulus tape contained ten fragments of the five dyads, 
with 33 thoughts and feelings to infer for the perceiving participants. Only film 
fragments that were meaningful without seeing the rest of the video were included in 
the standard stimulus tape. The standard stimulus tape lasted for 18 min 24 s. The 
acquaintance situation lasted for 8 min 24 s and contained 15 thoughts/feelings to 
infer (8 of an adolescent with ADHD) and the game situation lasted for 10 min and 
contained 18 thoughts/feelings to infer (10 of an adolescent with ADHD). 
Through the making of the standard stimulus tapes, we were able to study both 
the overt behaviour and the covert thoughts and feelings of the targets. Four 
independent adult judges coded the measures relevant for this study. The overt 
measures included behaviours typical for children with ADHD: expressivity, 
hyperactivity, inattention and restlessness of the children. For every thought/feeling of 
the children, and after each of the two situations (as a global measure) the judges 
rated these behaviours on a 7-point scale. The covert measures, rated for each thought 
or feeling, were measured on the same scale and included the difficulty of inferring 
the specific content of each reported thought/feeling, the abstractness, and congruency 
between the (non)-verbal behaviour and the reported thought/feeling. Our analyses 
revealed no significant within-dyad and between-group differences with regard to any 
of these measures (see Table S1 and S2 in supplementary material). 
 
Based on the guidelines of Ickes and colleagues, the empathic accuracy scores 
were calculated by comparing each inference of the perceiving participant with the 
original thought/feeling entry obtained from the targets (Ickes et al., 1990). Six naive 
and independent coders were asked to compare each participant’s inferred 
thought/feeling with the corresponding original thought/feeling entry and to rate the 
level of similarity on a 3-point scale, ranging from 0 (essentially different content) 
through 1 (somewhat similar but not the same content) to 2 (essentially the same 
content) (‘I don’t know’ and missing answers were rated 0). The internal consistency 
(Cronbach’s alpha) of the six judges’ empathic accuracy ratings was .88 for the ASD 
group, .63 for the ADHD group and .85 for the control group.  
 2.3 Procedure 
All participants started with the Empathic Accuracy Task. While the 
participants were watching the videotape, the tape was paused at the precise moments 
when a target had recorded a specific thought or feeling. The participants were then 
asked to make inferences about the thought/feeling entries of the targets and to write 
down the specific content of it. To ensure that the task was fully understood, the 
context of the tapes was described and the participants could practise first with 
another, short videotape. Subsequently, the child version of the “Reading the Mind in 
the Eyes” Test (Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, Spong et al., 2001) was administered. 
Finally, the participants and their parents were asked to fill in the IRI (Davis, 1983).  
All participants and their parents gave written informed consent. The study 
was approved by the ethical committee of the Faculty of Psychology and Educational 
Sciences of Ghent University.   
 
3. Results 
3.1 Interpersonal Reactivity Index (IRI) 
For each IRI subscale a 3 (‘Group’: ASD vs ADHD vs controls) x 2 (‘Judge’: 
self vs parent) design was used in a series of repeated measures analyses. The group 
means are presented in Table 2. Table 3 presents the F-values of the statistical 
analyses.  
 
Insert Table 2 and Table 3 here 
 
As can be seen in Table 3, a main effect of Group was found for all IRI 
subscales. Furthermore, a main effect of Judge was found for the Perspective Taking 
subscale and interaction effects between Judge and Group were found for the 
Perspective Taking, Empathic Concern and Personal Distress subscales. Post hoc 
analyses (Bonferroni) showed that adolescents with ASD obtained significantly lower 
scores than adolescents with ADHD and TD adolescents on the IRI subscale Fantasy 
(p < .001 for both contrasts). A closer look at the interaction effects revealed that only 
for adolescents with ASD a significant difference between self and parent report was 
observed for the Perspective Taking (p < .01) and Personal Distress (p < .05) 
subscales. Adolescents with ASD reported significantly higher scores for Perspective 
Taking and significantly lower scores for Personal Distress than their parents. For the 
Empathic Concern subscale only the control adolescents showed a significant 
difference between self and parent report (p < .05). Typically developing adolescents 
reported significantly lower scores on this subscale than their parents. As a 
consequence of the interaction effects the group contrasts were different according to 
the judge (see Table 3).   
    
3.2 “Reading the Mind in the Eyes” Test (Eyes Test)  
The MANOVA revealed significant between-group differences for scores on 
the Eyes Test and Gender Task (see Table 4). Post hoc analyses (Bonferroni) showed 
a significant difference for Eyes Test scores between adolescents with ASD and the 
control group, in favour of the TD adolescents (p < .05). For the Gender Task, there 
were no differences between the adolescents with ADHD and the control group. Both 
groups outperformed the adolescents with ASD (p < .01). As the time needed to 
complete the test was not normally distributed, a Kruskal-Wallis test was used (see 
Table 4). There were no differences between the adolescents with ADHD and the 
control group. Both groups were faster than the adolescents with ASD (p < .001). 
  
Insert Table 4 here 
 
3.3 Empathic Accuracy Task  
A 3 (‘Group’: ASD vs ADHD vs controls) x 2 (‘Target’: Target with ADHD 
vs Typically developing target) design was used in a repeated measures analysis, with 
Group as between-subjects factor and Target as within-subjects factor (see Table 5). 
Significant main effects for Group (F(2,41) =  4.74, p < .05) and for Target (F(1,41) = 
31.54, p < .001) were found. The adolescents with ASD obtained significantly lower 
empathic accuracy scores than the typically developing adolescents (p < .05). The 
empathic accuracy scores of adolescents with ADHD were not significantly different 
from those of the adolescents with ASD (p = .25) nor from those of the TD 
adolescents (p = .94). Furthermore all participants obtained better empathic accuracy 
scores when inferring the thoughts and feelings of a target person without ADHD in 
comparison to the thoughts and feelings of a target person with ADHD. Mean 
empathic accuracy scores are presented in Table 6. To control for external factors 
influencing the readability of the targets in the standard stimulus tapes, we looked at 
the between group differences with regard to the targets’ behavioural and actual 
thought/feeling measures and the between group differences with regard to the 
thematic topic of the targets’ thoughts and feelings. No differences were found for 
these measures between target persons with and without ADHD (see supplementary 
material). Finally the correlations between the total empathic accuracy score, age and 
IQ scores were calculated. In the group of adolescents with ASD a significant positive 
correlation was found between age and the total empathic accuracy score (r(13) = .63, 
p < .05). In the total sample and the other subgroups no significant correlations with 
empathic accuracy score were found.  
 
Insert Table 5 and Table 6 here 
 
4. Discussion  
In the present study, the mind-reading abilities of adolescents with ASD, 
adolescents with ADHD and typically developing adolescents were investigated and 
compared. For this purpose, a static and a more naturalistic measure of empathic 
accuracy and an empathy questionnaire were used. This study is the first to administer 
the empathic accuracy task in adolescents with ASD and adolescents with ADHD. 
As expected, adolescents with ASD obtained lower scores than the typically 
developing adolescents on all mind-reading measures. The results of the static Eyes 
Test are in line with the research findings of Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, Spong et al. 
(2001), who found children with ASD to be significantly impaired on the Eyes Test. 
On the other hand, the results differ from those of both Roeyers et al. (2001) and 
Ponnet et al. (2004) who failed to find a difference between adults with ASD and 
typically developing adults. It is possible that age and developmental level account for 
the poorer performance of the adolescents with ASD on the Eyes Test. The 
development of theory of mind in children with ASD seems to be both delayed and 
deviant (Serra, Loth, Van Geert, Hurkens, & Minderaa, 2002). However, even adults 
with HFA and AS sometimes fail this static measure of perspective taking (Baron-
Cohen, Jolliffe et al., 1997; Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright et al., 1997), so there might 
be other factors that also influence the performance on this task.   
On the more naturalistic Empathic Accuracy Test, adolescents with ASD again 
performed worse than typically developing adolescents. Clearly, adolescents with 
ASD experience difficulties in inferring the thoughts and feelings of others. These 
results are consistent with previous research, where persons with ASD showed 
impaired empathic accuracy abilities if the task was sufficiently complex (Roeyers et 
al., 2001; Ponnet et al., 2004).  
For both measures of empathic accuracy (Eyes Test and Empathic Accuracy 
Test) adolescents with ADHD performed as an intermediate category between the 
adolescents with ASD and the control group. Their scores did not differ significantly 
from those of the control group nor from those of the adolescents with ASD. Probably 
these non-significant findings are due to limited power (.37 for ADHD vs ASD and 
.20 for ADHD vs controls), but they may suggest that the mind-reading performance 
of the adolescents with ADHD cannot be considered to be normal. Barkley (2006) 
also argued that children with ADHD would show less empathy and a reduced 
perspective taking ability due to their inhibitory control deficits.  
Besides the performance-based measures of perspective taking, the empathy 
questionnaire IRI was administered to the adolescents and their parents to assess 
perceived mind-reading abilities. As expected, adolescents with ASD and their 
parents reported lower scores on all subscales of the IRI in comparison with TD 
adolescents and their parents. Furthermore, in the ASD group an informant effect was 
found for the PT and PD subscales. Adolescents with ASD reported significantly 
higher scores for Perspective Taking and significantly lower scores for Personal 
Distress than their parents. This informant effect with regard to perspective taking 
was also found in the study of Roeyers, Buysse, Ponnet, & De Corte (2010). Despite 
this informant effect, adolescents with ASD seem to have insight into their poor 
perspective taking abilities, at least to a certain extent. These results are consistent 
with Ponnet’s study (Ponnet et al., 2004), where adults with ASD seemed to be aware 
of their empathic impairment.  
Parents of adolescents with ADHD reported lower scores for the IRI subscales 
‘Perspective Taking’ and ‘Empathic Concern’, in comparison with the parents of the 
TD group. Thus, parents of adolescents with ADHD consider their children as less 
prone to take the perspective of someone else and to experience feelings of warmth, 
compassion and concern for other people, which supports the idea of ADHD as an 
empathic disorder (Gillberg, 1992). The adolescents with ADHD themselves did not 
report a significant difference for their perspective taking tendency in comparison 
with the TD group. These results are in line with those of Marton et al. (2009), who 
also failed to find a difference between ADHD and comparison children in self-
reported empathy, while their parents rated the children with ADHD as less empathic. 
It is possible that the adolescents with ADHD have less insight into their impaired 
empathic abilities. Another explanation can be found in a social desirable way of 
answering the questionnaire (Marton et al., 2009).    
 
An innovative aspect in the Empathic Accuracy task was the use of standard 
stimulus tapes with target dyads, which consisted of one adolescent with ADHD and 
one adolescent without ADHD. We did find a difference in the ‘readability’ of targets 
with and without ADHD. All participants obtained higher empathic accuracy scores 
when inferring the thoughts and feelings of TD targets than when they had to infer the 
thoughts and feelings of the targets with ADHD. Not only the empathic abilities and 
other characteristics of the perceivers seem to have an impact on the final empathic 
accuracy score. Characteristics of the target persons can influence the performance of 
the perceivers on the empathic accuracy task as well (Luteijn et al., 2000). It could be 
possible that the TD target persons reported thoughts/feelings that are easier to infer, 
more concrete or more clearly formulated, or that their behaviour was more congruent 
with their unspoken thoughts/feelings. Furthermore, it could be possible that target 
children with ADHD performed high levels of impulsivity, hyperactivity, restlessness 
and expressivity, and that this would diminish their readability. To rule out this 
possibility, we compared the mean scores on the covert and overt measures, but no 
differences were found between targets with and without ADHD (see supplementary 
material). The lack of difference on these measures indicates that the lower 
'readability' of targets with ADHD is not the consequence of having less apparent 
thoughts and feelings because of their (non) verbal cues. So we were not able to 
clarify which factors attribute to the readability of the thoughts and feelings of the two 
groups of target persons. This issue remains a challenge that can be addressed in 
future research.   
 
We acknowledge that our study has some limitations, with limited sample 
sizes as the most important one. A second hiatus of the current study concerns the 
absence of IQ information of the control group. However, since IQ was not correlated 
with any of the dependent measures, we do not expect group differences to be due to 
differences in IQ.  
 
5. Conclusions 
In summary, our findings indicate that adolescents with ASD are less able to 
infer the thoughts and feelings of others in comparison to typically developing 
adolescents. This result confirms our hypothesis that adolescents with ASD show 
impaired mind-reading abilities and is consistent with the ToM hypothesis. 
Adolescents with ADHD do not show clear deficits in mind-reading abilities, but their 
mind-reading performance does not differ significantly from that of the adolescents 
with ASD either. Moreover, their parents report an impaired tendency of their 
children with ADHD to take the perspective of someone else in comparison to the 
control group. These findings challenge claims that problems with ToM are specific 
to ASD (Buitelaar et al., 1999). This implicates that ToM measures cannot be used in 
a diagnostic process to differentiate between ASD and ADHD.  
In addition, the Empathic Accuracy Task proved to be a valid and reliable 
method to measure adolescents’ ability to infer the thoughts and feelings of others, 
even in adolescents with ASD and adolescents with ADHD.  
 
In future research, it would be worthwhile to examine the effect of 
characteristics of the target persons in the empathic accuracy task. As we found a 
significant difference in the empathic accuracy scores for thoughts and feelings of 
targets with and without ADHD, it should be possible to identify factors that 
influence the readability of a target person. We controlled for several of these factors, 
but there can be others that we did not take into account. It might also be useful to 
include a set of control videos with two TD targets to compare their readability with 
that of the control target in interaction with the target with ADHD. 
Another topic that can be addressed in future studies concerns the fact that, 
despite the average lower empathic accuracy scores of adolescents with ASD, some 
participants of this group managed to infer the thoughts and feelings of the targets 
quite well. It would be interesting to investigate how these ‘empathic’ adolescents 
with ASD differ from those with a poor empathic accuracy score. In our sample, only 
an effect of age was found on the empathic abilities of the adolescents with ASD. 
This finding supports the notion that the development of theory of mind in children 
with ASD seems to be delayed (Serra et al., 2002).  
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Table 1  
Descriptive characteristics of the sample 
 ASD 
n = 13 
ADHD 
n = 13 
Controls 
















χ²(2) = 1.91 
 M SD M SD M SD  
Age 14.35 1.24 13.69 1.43 13.86 1.73 F(2,41) < 1 
IQ        
TIQ 101.54 11.56 102.92 11.59 - - F(1,24) < 1 
VIQ 98.00 11.92 106.08 9.50   F(1,24) = 3.65  
PIQ 105.23 14.31 99.62 15.63   F(1,30) < 1 




Table 2  
Group means and standard deviances for the IRI 
 ASD ADHD Control group 
 Self Parent Self Parent Self Parent 
 M SD M SD M SD M SD M SD M SD 
PTa 12.83 4.49 3.50 4.93 19.54 3.91 16.46 4.27 24.13 5.14 21.88 5.84 
Fb 12.29 4.46 8.00 4.50 22.15 5.58 22.46 4.50 22.31 4.77 22.38 5.16 
ECc 13.63 7.22 9.50 2.43 22.54 4.58 23.23 4.80 25.44 3.05 27.88 4.08 
PDd 12.14 4.78 18.57 4.76 19.85 5.05 21.85 5.64 19.38 4.67 17.31 7.02 




Repeated Measures analyses on IRI subscales: F-values and contrasts 
 F-values  Contrasts 
Perspective Taking    
Group F(2,32) =  31.90 *** ASD < ADHD < TDe 
Judge F(1,32) =  20.00 *** Parent < Self 
Group x Judge F(2,32) =  3.26 p = .05 Self report: ASD < TDe 
Parent report: ASD < ADHD < TDe 
Fantasy    
Group F(2,33) =  28.96 *** ASD < ADHD = TDe 
Judge F(1,33) =  1.46   
Group x Judge F(2,33) =  1.51   
Empathic Concern    
Group F(2,32) =  38.32 *** ASD < ADHD < TDe 
Judge F(1,32) =  0.20   
Group x Judge F(2,32) =  4.13 * Self report: ASD < ADHD = TDe 
Parent report: ASD < ADHD < TDe 
Personal Distress    
Group F(2,33) =  3.33 * ASD < ADHD 
Judge F(1,33) =  3.74   
Group x Judge F(2,33) =  4.80 * Self report: ASD < ADHD = TDe 
Parent report: ns 
* p < .05, *** p < .001 
a PT = Perspective Taking, b F = Fantasy, c EC = Empathic Concern, d PD = Personal Distress, e TD = 




Mean scores on the Eyes Test and Gender Task, Medians for Needed time and F- and γ2-
values   
 ASD 
n = 13 
ADHD 
n = 13 
Controls 
n = 18 
  
 M SD M SD M SD F(2,47) Contrasts 
Eyes Test 16.23 3.92 18.62 2.93 19.17 2.55 3.57 * ASD < TDa 
Gender Task 25.77 1.69 27.69 0.48 27.28 0.75 11.95 *** ASD < ADHD = TDa 
 Md  Md  Md  γ2 (2)  
Needed time 579.00  339.00  347.00  18.15 *** ADHD = TDa < ASD 
* p <.05, *** p < .001 














Repeated Measures analysis on EA scores: F-values and contrasts 
 F-values  Contrasts 
Group F(2,41) =  4.74 * ASD < TDa 
Target F(1,41) = 31.54 *** ADHD target < TDa target 
Target * Group F(2,41) =   0.37  ns 
* p < .05, *** p < .001 




Table 6  
Mean results and standard deviances for the Empathic Accuracy Task  
 ASD 
n = 13 
ADHD 
n = 13 
Controls 
n = 18 
 M SD M SD M SD 
Empathic Accuracy 17.75 5.40 21.13 3.38 22.90 5.16 
       
    Target with ADHD 15.60 4.14 18.59 3.74 19.80 5.58 










METHODS – MAKING OF THE STANDARD STIMULUS TAPE 
Procedure 
The procedure used was based on Ickes and colleagues (Ickes, Stinson, Bissonnette, 
& Garcia, 1990; Marangoni, Garcia, Ickes, & Teng, 1995) and Ponnet and colleagues 
(Ponnet, Buysse, Roeyers, & De Corte, 2005). The dyad members (one with ADHD 
and one without ADHD), previously unacquainted to each other, were scheduled to 
come to the research centre at the same time. They were asked to participate in a 
study on “social interactions between peers”’.  
 
The procedure of the making of the standard stimulus tapes can be divided in two 
phases. 
 
Phase 1: Collection of the videotape data 
In order to avoid interaction prior to the experiment, participants were brought to 
different waiting rooms. Control children were kept unaware that their dyad member 
had the diagnosis of ADHD. Even so, the dyad member with ADHD was kept 
unaware whether or not his/her interaction partner had any kind of diagnosis. After 
checking that the participants were indeed strangers to each other, they were escorted 
to the observation room and directed to take place on the chairs. The experimenter 
told that they would play a game together and that they would be filmed after a period 
of 10 minutes practicing the game together without the experimenter. The participants 
signed a first informed consent and immediately after doing so, the experimenter was 
telephoned by another researcher who was sitting in the control room. This way, the 
experimenter could pretend that there was an urgent problem, and leave the 
participants alone. On the moment the experimenter had left the observation room, a 
second experimenter in the control room started the cameras. After 8 minutes, the 
videotaping stopped. The experimenter came back, apologized for the disruption, and 
gave an unfamiliar game to the subjects. The experimenter told that they would get 
some time alone, and that the videotaping and the real experiment would start when 
she came back. For the second time, the cameras were started at the moment that the 
experimenter left the room, so the participants were still unaware that the cameras 
were already videotaping. After 8 minutes, the experimenter returned and debriefed 
the participants. They were told that they were videotaped unobtrusively in order to 
study the spontaneous interaction that takes place between two peers. After signing a 
second, more detailed informed consent, participants were asked whether their tape 
could be used as data. It was made clear that if either of them did not want the tape to 
be used, it could be erased immediately. None of the participants refused the tape to 
be released and each of them signed all the consent forms. Ethical permission was 
sought and granted for this study. 
 
Phase 2: Collection of the thought/feeling data 
In the next part of the study, each participant was brought by an experimenter to one 
of two separate rooms, where he/she was asked to view the videotape and make a 
written record of all the unexpressed thoughts and feelings he/she remembered having 
had during the two 8-min interaction periods. The participants were instructed not to 
report thoughts and feelings that occurred to them for the first time while viewing the 
videotape. They were encouraged to report all of the thoughts as accurately and 
honestly as possible. The participants were assured that their interaction partner 
would never see the reported thoughts and feelings. The experimenter stopped the 
videotape when the participants wanted to report a thought or feeling, and asked the 
participants to write on a standardized thought/feeling coding form (a) the time the 
thought/feeling occurred, (b) whether the entry was a thought or a feeling, and (c) the 
specific content of the thought/feeling entry. No restriction of time was given.  
 
Behavioural and Actual Thought/Feeling Measures 
Through the dyad interaction design, we were able to study both the overt behaviour 
of the interacting dyad members, and the covert thoughts and feelings of the target 
participants. Four independent adult judges coded the measures relevant for this 
study. The overt behavioural measures included behaviours typical for children with 
ADHD: expressivity, hyperactivity, inattention and restlessness of the children. For 
every thought/feeling of the children, and after each of the two situations (as a global 
measure) the judges rated these behaviours on a 7-point scale. The covert measures, 
rated for each thought or feeling, were measured on the same scale and included the 
readability of the reported thought/feeling (how difficult it was to infer the specific 
content of each thought or feeling), the abstractness, and congruency between the 
(non)-verbal behaviour and the reported thought/feeling.  
 
RESULTS 
Between group differences with regard to the behavioural and actual 
thought/feeling measures 
As shown in Table S1, a series of paired t-tests revealed that there were no significant 
within-dyad differences in difficulty of inferring the thought/feeling (or the 
‘readability’), in the level of abstractness, in the congruency of the thought/feeling 
with the overt behaviour, and in the clearness of the formulation of the 
thought/feeling. In order to know more of the overt behaviours of the participants, we 
analyzed the expressivity, the restlessness, the hyperactivity or the inattention of the 
target. Between group comparisons revealed no significant differences with regard to 
any of these measures. All the mean scores were on a 7-point likert scale. 
 
Table S1 
The mean scores of the (c)overt measures of the ADHD and the control group on a 7-
point Likert Scale 
 
   Situation 1     Situation 2 
 
 ADHD Control  ADHD Control  
 M (SD) M (SD) t(18) M (SD) M (SD) t(18) 
       
Difficulty 4.00 (.52) 4.01 (.44) -.07 3.74 (.68) 3.58 (.52) .98 
Abstractness 2.78 (.42) 2.66 (.44) 1.21 2.81 (.57) 2.83 (.55) -.10 
Congruency 2.88 (.51) 2.87 (.44) .09 2.55 (.55) 2.48 (.52) .46 
Clearness 1.54 (.26) 1.55 (.18) -.25 1.39 (.28) 1.41 (.18) -.28 
       
Expressivity 4.38 (.79) 4.50 (.77) -.65 3.72 (.77) 3.97 (.82) -.91 
Restlessness 4.62 (.94) 4.77 (.89) -.51 4.41 (.86) 4.83 (.76) -1.54 
Hyperactivity 4.54 (.85) 4.60 (.84) -.28 4.11 (.70) 4.51 (.63) -1.97 
Inattention 4.54 (.60) 4.52 (.67) .10 4.86 (.55) 5.07 (.56) -1.43 
 
 
Between group with regard to the thematic topic of the reported thoughts/feelings 
Furthermore, we were interested in between group differences with regard to the 
thematic topic of the reported thoughts and feelings. We analyzed the thematic topic 
of the thought/feelings and made two broad categories, person and subject, each 
divided in subcategories. A series of univariate analyses of variance (ANOVA) was 





The mean percentages of thought/feeling entries belonging to the ADHD and the 
control group 
 
   Situation 1     Situation 2 
 
 ADHD Control  ADHD Control  
 M (SD) M (SD) t(18) M (SD) M (SD) t(18) 
       
Person       
Itself 38.34 (23.53) 22.79 (14.44)  2.39* 25.28 (28.01) 28.86 (23.01) -.37 
Interaction 
partner 
20.06 (18.33) 27.01 (17.57) -1.13 26.46 (22.19) 22.37 (17.41) .71 
Researcher 11.64 (12.51) 12.54 (16.22) -.19  4.23  (7.01)   1.17 (3.50) 1.57 
None 32.08 (19.48) 40.50 (24.71) -1.22 52.65 (30.78) 49.93 (31.25) .28 
Subject       
The room 43.82 (27.34) 49.18 (22.59) -.94  3.11 (7.26)  3.93  (6.57) -.41 
Context/ 
game 
44.49 (75.33) 32.50 (24.24) .82 92.91 (9.31) 89.63 (12.87) 1.67 




As shown in Table S2, no significant differences with regard to the subject of the 
though/feeling entries were found. However, a significant difference was found with 
regard to the thoughts and feelings that focused on the person itself, t(18) = 2.39, p < 
.05, indicating that children with ADHD had more thoughts and feelings that focused 
on themselves than the control children. This difference was found only in the first 
situation.   
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